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FIRGINIA SECTION 
THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIRGINIA LAW 
CONTRACTS AND SALES 
] oseph Curtis* 
The courts in Virginia, federal and state, passed upon an average num-
ber of contracts and sales issues during the period covered by this Survey. 
A surprising number were not of the recurring variety, determinations of 
which serve primarily as reassertions of the state of the law, but presented 
somewhat unique problems either in their facts or in the law for the courts 
to resolve. Intriguing questions such as the enforceability of an option 
to buy at an unspecified price if a seller should decide to sell, whether a 
failure to obtain a building permit upon informal inquiry constitutes im-
possibility, and when does a formally executed instrument which was not 
intended to be binding become so by complying with its terms, were 
presented for determination. Others, perhaps less troublesome in the 
law involved, were nevertheless of interest in their unusual fact settings, 
such as a sister's receiving funds to pass on to the other woman in her 
brother's life from both her deceased brother and his surviving wife. 
It is a case in the field of sales, however, which may prove to be of 
the greatest significance in the development of Virginia law, nudging the 
state a little closer to the Sales Act adherents. 
In greater detail, the following are the matters. which the courts con-
sidered. 
• Professor of Law, William and Mary. Member, New York and Virginia Bars. B.S., 
1934, LL.B., 1937, LL.M., 1948, New York University. 
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A. Seller's Irritation Not Appeased at Broker's Expense 
A seller's arbitrary refusal to consummate a sale of his property will 
not defeat the broker's right to commissions if the latter has produced a 
purchaser who is ready, able and willing to buy upon terms which the 
seller has agreed upon. This result is usually reached even where the 
broker's employment is "to effect a sale" and not just "to procure a 
purchaser." 1 
In Hawthorne v. HannowelJ2 the seller was displeased that advance word 
of the prospective deal had been given out, suspecting the intended female 
escrow agent of having made the disclosure. He rejected the broker's 
suggestion, made to pacify him and save . the deal, that another be 
substituted as escrow agent and refused to go through with the sale. While 
the reason for the seller's refusal was disputed, the seller contending that 
his price was not met, the Court found the evidence sufficient to support 
the lower court's finding that the purchaser was willing to buy on the 
seller's terms. The Court conceded that the commissions of a real estate 
broker are contingent and acknowledged that in addition to producing 
a willing purchaser the broker must also show "that the sale was not con-
cluded by reason of some fault or misrepresentation of the seller." 3 If 
the seller's irritation is to justify his refusal, apparently it should be at-
tributable to some matter more commonplace than feminine communica-
tiveness, at least in so far as he may expect his broker to pay for appeasing 
it. The proposition of law that a consummation of the sale is not a con-
dition precedent to the broker's right to his commission is here observed,4 
and as to the factual aspects of the case, a seller, irritated 'by the premature 
disclosures of a third party, may have to pay a broker's commission to satisfy 
his spite. 
B. Broker's Purchaser Willing and Able, But Not Ready To Buy 
Real estate brokers had more than their constitutional day in court 
before the Supreme Court of Appeals during the 1960-1961 Term, but 
the second day proved to be not so auspicious for the profession. The 
question of whether a broker earns his commission when he produces a 
purchaser who introduces conditions to his meeting the seller's terms, was 
presented to the Court in Rotella v. Lange.5 The purchaser was willing to 
I. See Annot., 169 AL.R. 605, 607 (1947). 
2. 202 Va. 70, 115 S.E.2d 889 (1960): 
3. Id. at 76, 115 S.E.2d at 893, quoting Bear v. Parrish, 148 Va. 754, 760, 139 S.E. 488, 
489 (1927). 
4. The Court cited and followed Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 114 S.E. 652 (1922), 
and Snider v. New River Ins. & Realty Corp., 187 Va. 548, 47 S.E.2d 398 (1948). 
5. 202 Va. 575, 118 S.E.2d 516 (1961). 
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buy the defendant's restaurant business for the price and upon the terms 
set forth by the defendant if he could obtain an A.B.C. license, a health 
permit, and a five year lease of the property upon which it was conducted, 
the current lease having less than three years to run. The Court viewed 
the proffered conditions as constituting a counteroffer and reversed the 
judgment, which had been in the broker's favor. The opinion reflects 
that whether such a response to an offer be termed a conditional acceptance 
or a counteroffer, it constitutes, in legal effect, a rejection of the original 
offer. More specifically, as pertinent to the requirements of a broker's right 
to a commission, the right is contingent not only on his purchaser being 
able and willing to buy on the seller's terms, but also on his readiness 
to do so. 
Also significant in the case is the Court's disposition of the issue, raised 
by the broker, that because the defendant had received two prior offers 
from the prospect, similarly conditioned but offering less than seller was 
asking, and seller had expressed objection only as to the price and not as 
to the conditions, seller's agreement to the conditions should be implied. 
Seller was thereby estopped, contends the broker, to assert thereafter 
these imposed conditions as a nonacceptance of his terms. Excepting the 
case of tender of a certified check in lieu of cash, there is no waiver of 
a proper ground for rejection by failure expressly to assert it.6 This 
principle is applied, not only where the one who rejects offers no reason for 
doing so, but as well wllere he asserts an improper one and fails to 
mention the justifiable grounds.7 All the more so is this the rule where 
he asserts one of two proper grounds and, for whatever reason, fails to 
mention the other. The Supreme Court of Appeals alloted few words 
to instruct that this principle is equally applicable to the rejection of 
a broker's proffered purchaser. 
C. Circumstances Not Warranting Implied Condition 
Virginia Code section 11-238 requires that the performance bond of a 
general contractor be conditioned upon the payment to all persons perform-
ing labor and furnishing materials in the prosecution of work upon a public 
building and gives to such laborers and materialmen a direct right of action 
against the obligor and sureties on the bond.9 
6. The e:'l:ception made as to payment by check is based upon commercial custom. 
See REsTAlEl\iENT, CoNTRAcrs § 305 (1932). 
7. Of course, if his failure to mention the proper ground is accompanied by conduct 
tending to mislead the other party in that respect, he may thereby be estopped. See 
List & Son Co. v. Chase, SO Ohio St. 42, 88 N.E. 120 (1909). 
8. VA. ConE ANN.§ 11-23 (Supp. 1960). 
9. \Vhere the discharge of a performance bond is e:..:pressly conditioned upon pay-
ment to materialmen, the latter's direct right of action against the surety is generally 
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· In order to enable the plumbing subcontractor to obtain materials and 
supplies on credit, the general contractor agreed to make the monthly 
checks for the amounts to become due subcontractor payable jointly to 
him and the supplying company. Supply retained only so much of the 
proceeds of each monthly check as amounted to the current balance of 
Subcontractor's running account, and remitted the excess to Subcontractor. 
It was held in Paulson v. Hajoca Corp.10 that, absent Supply's promise 
to do so, Supply was under no obligation to retain the full amount of 
each check until the completion of Subcontractor's work in order to 
hold General Contractor and his surety on the performance bond for the 
amount of Subcontractor's indebtedness arising subsequent to the issuance 
of the last joint · check. The Court found the evidence insufficient to 
support any express condition to that effect, and that p.o such condition 
should be implied merely from Supply's insistence and General Contractor's 
consent that Supply be made a joint payee of the monthly installment 
checks. Especially such an implication was not warranted in view of the 
fact that both Supply and General Contractor understood that Subcon-
tractor had little capital and would need some of the proceeds of each 
payment check with which to pay other suppliers with whom he was 
dealing and thereby remain in business. Supply's judgment against the 
General Contractor and Surety was affirmed. 
D. Equity and Good Conscience Prevail 
If its facts should be taken for dramatic adaptation, Purr v. Arnoldl1 
might be entitled "The Case of the Cleaner Hands," and it has a better 
plot than most shows. 
Husband borrowed 5,000 dollars and deposited it in a joint checking 
account with Wife. About to undergo a surgical operation, he gave his 
sister a check for 3,500 dollars with the understanding that if he should 
not survive she was to retain 1,500 dollars and give the balance of 2,000 
dollars to a lady friend, well known to Sister but not to Wife. He did 
not survive. Sister thereupon deposited the check in her own account and 
issued a check thereon for 2,000 dollars to Friend. However the ointment 
had been prepared by Husband having informed Wife that he wished 
Sister to have 3,500 dollars in the event of his death. The fly flew into 
it when, after Husband's death, Wife, possibly far more obliging than 
she supposed, wrote a check upon the same account for 3,500 dollars and 
upheld on the third party beneficiary concept, even in the absence of statute and 
irrespective of whether the contract is a public one. See 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs 
§ 372 (3d ed. 1959). 
10. 202 Va.447, 117 S.E.2d 692 (1961). 
11. 202 Va. 684, 119 S.E.2d 242 (1961). 
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exchanged it for a bank cashier's check, which was then presented to Sister 
with the explanation that her brother desired that she should have it. 
\Vife's check cleared before Sister's deposited check, resulting in the 
dishonor of the latter and, in sequence, Sister's check to Friend, for in-
sufficient funds. 
Sister rejected Friend's claim to make good the 2,000 dollar check, 
contending that her brother intended that she should have 5,000 dollars 
in all, and that there was a failure of consideration for 2,000 of the 
3,500 dollars that she was to have given Friend. There was, concludes the 
Court on this evidence, but one fund out of which it was intended and 
agreed that Friend was to receive 2,000 dollars, and by whatever means 
this fund came into Sister's hands, Husband's check or cashier's check, in 
equity and good conscience 2,000 dollars of it was Friend's. Another excep-
tion to the requirement of consideration is here acknowledged. Equity and 
good conscience proved to be as effective a reply to the defense of failure 
of consideration as is "action in reliance" 12 to that of no consideration. 
E. No Specific Enforcement Without Ascertainment of All Essential Terms 
A specifically enforceable contract must be complete and certain in all 
of its essential terms. Applying this principle in Rolfs v. Mason,I3 the 
Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's refusal to decree 
specific performance of an owner's promise that if he should decide to 
sell his property, he would give the promisee "first choice." The Court 
agreed that such a provision neither fixes the price, an essential term, nor 
provides any way for ascertaining it with certainty. 
In a previous Virginia case, however, where the promisee learned of 
promisor's willingness to sell the property at a certain price and then 
informed the latter that he wished to exercise his right to buy it at that 
price, specific performance was granted when subsequently the promisor 
sold it to another.14 But there the provision recited that the promisee 
was to have the first privilege of buying "on terms to be agreed upon at 
the time such agreement is made," and the Court determined that the 
seller's undisputed willingness to sell, together with the promisee's mani-
fested willingness to buy, at the price for which the property was sold 
to the third party thereby fi:'i:ed the price in the mode prescribed by the 
contract. In the Rolfs case, the provision went no further than to state that 
if the promisors "should sell . . . they shall give . . . [the promisees] first 
choice." The Court's opinion distinguished this wording from that of the 
one previously quoted and follows precedents of other jurisdictions holding 
12. See REsTATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs § 90 (1932). 
13. 202 Va. 690, 119 S.E.2d 238 (1961). 
14. Parker v. Murphy, 152 Va. 173, 146 S.E. 254 (1929). 
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that a "first opportunity" option which does not provide a means for deter-
mining the price cannot be specifically enforced.15 
While the holding has considerable support in case precedent, it seems 
somewhat strange that the courts have not been willing to imply that the 
option price, if the option should become exercisable through the promisor's 
readiness to sell, was to be whatever price for which the promisor was 
willing to sell to any other. That such was the intention of the parties 
seems irresistible, and the courts have not been hesitant to determine an 
agreed price by implication in other situations in which the apparent 
intent of the parties justified it.16 
F. Impossibility Must Be Founded on More Than Superficial Effort 
Supervening illegality of a promised performance is generally acknowl-
edged to be such impossibility as will excuse a promisor's duty to render 
it. A change in the zoning regulations which would thereupon prevent 
a contractor from constructing the type of building specified by the 
contract relieves him from his obligation to do soP 
In Pennsylvania State Shopping Plazas, Inc. v. Olive,I8 the new zoning 
law permitted a variance in the regulations and allowed the planning com-
mission some discretion in the granting of building permits for the use 
contemplated by the contract. Defendants' attorney discussed with the 
county planning director and the planning commission the possibility of 
obtaining a use permit to erect a gasoline service station which defendants 
had agreed to construct and lease to plaintiff as part of the consideration 
for the sale to them of plaintiff's land. He was advised that no such permit 
could be issued for the area dimensions set forth in the contract, and this 
informal determination was contended by defendants to meet the require-
ments of an impossibility of performance defense to plaintiff's suit for 
damages. Mr. Justice I'Anson pointed out that the attorney, when con-
15. Machesky v. City of Milwaukee, 253 N.W. 169 (Wis. 1934); Wolf v. Lodge, 
159 Iowa 162, 140 N.W. 429 (1913); Folsom v. Harr, 218 ill. 369, 75 N.E. 987 (1905); 
Fogg v. Price, 145 Mass. 513, 14 N.E. 741 (1888); Audreula v. Slovak Gymnastic Union, 
140 N.J. Eq. 171, 53 A.2d 191 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947). 
16. The standard of reasonableness is frequently invoked in employment contracts 
and contracts for the sale of goods. See 1 WILLISToN, CoNTRACTS § 41 (3d ed. 1957). 
''The court should be slow to come to ••• [the] conclusion [that an agreement is too 
indefinite as to price] if it is convinced that the parties themselves meant to make a 
'contract' and to bind themselves to render a future performance." 1 CoRBIN, CoNTRACTS 
§ 97 (1950). A lessee's option to buy land has been specifically enforced, although 
no price was named, the court finding the reasonable price by implication. Shayeb 
v. Holland, 321 Mass.429, 73 N.E.2d 731 (1947). 
17. See Poledor v. Mayerfield, 94 Ind. App. 601, 176 N.E. 32 (1931); cf. DiBiasio v. 
Ross, 43 R.I. 78, 110 Atl. 415 (1920) (prevention of repairs by building inspector). 
18. 202 Va. 862, 120 S.E.2d 372 (1961). 
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fronted with this informal response to his inquiry, did not sufficiently ex-
plore the possibilities of obtaining the necessary permit, or a discretionary 
variance in the zoning regulations, as he might have done by the filing 
of a formal application which would at least have reserved a right of 
appeal to the zoning board. The Court resolved that the burden of seeking 
to obtain the permit was upon the defendants and that their efforts in 
that respect were not expended with sufficient diligence. "While im-
possibility need not, perhaps, be absolute in order to constitute a valid 
defense, it does at least connote that defendant's failure to perform was not 
-attributable to his own eagerness to regard impediments as insurmountable 
barriers. 
Another interesting issue in the case, and that part in which the lower 
court's decree was reversed, was the amount of damages allowable for 
defendant's breach of its duty to construct and lease the service station. The 
lower court had correctly instructed the jury that the damages for breach 
of a contract to lease real property were to be measured by the difference 
between the rent agreed upon and the rental value of the premises, and that 
they were not to consider the loss of anticipated profits from the business 
intended to be conducted on the premises. Plaintiff had injected some 
evidence of what he could expect his profits to be, and the Court found 
it apparent that the jury had considered this evidence in its determination 
of the rental value. The Court observed a distinction between the interrup-
tion of an established business and the prevention of a new one, holding 
that the anticipated profits of the latter are too speculative and should 
not have been considered by the jury in determining rental value.19 
G. When a Contract Which Is Not a Contract Becomes One 
Coal mine operator signed what purported to be a contract with the 
United Mine ·workers, agreeing to pay to its Welfare and Retirement 
Fund forty cents for each ton of coal produced. He contended that the 
agreement was intended merely as a formality or "sham" to give an appear-
ance of compliance with the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, 
and that it was understood that he would actually have to pay only what he 
could. 
In Le·wis v. Lowry20 the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia granted the trustee of the fund summary judgment 
19. In this respect, occasionally a distinction is made between an industrial or manu-
facturing business and one which is professional or service rendering, classified as 
nonindustrial. See 15 Ar.r. ]uR. Damages § 134 (1938). The Court, in passing upon 
the issue, speaks of ascertaining the rental value of premises leased for a nonindustrial 
business. Generally, however, the crux is in the further distinction between a going 
business and a new one. 
20. 190 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Va. 1960). 
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for the difference between the amount which the operator did pay to 
the fund and the forty cents per ton called for by the written contract. 
The court determined that the evidence left no room to doubt that the 
mine operator had subsequently ratified the contract, even if it were to 
hold, which it did not, that the agreement was not effective upon execu-
tion. Ratification was found in the operator's having computed his pay-
ments to the fund on the forty cents per ton basis,21 and also in his ac-
ceptance of the benefits of the provision, as his employee miners had been 
working his mines under the assumption, induced by his references in 
correspondence with their representatives, that the provision was in full 
force and effect. There was also a defense of duress, but the court found 
none. 
Perhaps the more interesting legal question, at least one of greater general 
significance, is whether the parol evidence rule would preclude the de-
fense of the alleged oral understanding, not offered to vary the terms of the 
written contract, but to show that the parties had no intent to enter into 
one. The court briefly alludes to it in a tone from which it might be 
inferred that, even without the finding of ratification, it would have held 
the defense untenable on the grounds that otherwise it "would open the 
door to varying solemn written contracts by prior oral agreements .... " 22 
Query, however, is not parol evidence always competent, at least in 
equity, to show the nonexistence of a contract?23 
The same facts and issues are present in the companion case of Lewis v. 
Premium Darby Coal Corp.,24 where summary judgment was granted plain-
tiff in accordance with Lowry. 
H. Indemnitee's Expenses in Defending Initial Claim 
In General Elec. Co. v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc.,25 the same district 
court decided that reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred 
21. It appears that while defendant did compute his payments at forty cents per ton, 
it is likely that he did so only for the record, the same reason for which he had 
executed the formal instrument, i.e., to preserve appearances, and compensated for 
it by reporting less than the actual number of tons produced. If such were done with 
the knowledge of the plaintiffs, of which there is no indication in the court's opinion, 
it would seem that this conduct should no more constitute a ratification than would 
the execution of the instrument itself constitute a binding agreement. 
22. Lewis v. Lowry, 190 F. Supp. 490,492 (W.D. Va. 1960). 
23. "If the [oral] evidence [that the writing signed by the parties was not intended 
as a contract] was inadmissible at law . . . it was certainly admissible in equity to pre-
vent the accomplishment of what any court of chancery must consider and treat as 
fraud." Michels v. Olmstead, 157 U.S. 198, 201 (1895). See generally 20 AM. juR. 
Evidence§ 1094 (1939). 
24.190F.Supp.493 (W.D.Va.1960). 
25. 186 F. Supp. 761 (W.D. Va. 1960). 
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by an indemnitee in defending a prior action against him by a third party, 
which resulted in the judgment for which he seeks indemnity, are a proper 
element of damages recoverable in his subsequent action against the in-
demnitor, as well as is the amount of the judgment itself. The general rule 
that attorneys' fees and other expenses of litigation are not recoverable in the 
absence of statute was observed by the court in denying recovery of such 
items incurred in prosecuting the action against the indemnitor. The opinion 
explores the texts26 and case law27 on the point of making an exception 
of the costs of defending the claim indemnified against and finds substantial 
uniformity supporting it, especially where the contract of indemnity is an 
express one. The court found no reason to reach a different result ap-
plicable to an implied contract, which was the case of the one before it.28 
This exception to the general rule appears to be well justified in the light 
that the expenses of defending the claim of the third party are more so an 
integral part of the loss indemnified against than are the expenses of the 
suit against the indemnitor, to which the general rule applies, which are 
incurred in establishing the right to indemnity. The same distinction per-
sists whether the duty of the indemnitor is imposed by law or by express 
agreement of the parties. 
I. Warranty of Merchantability 
A significant and helpful concession has been made by the Supreme 
Court of Appeals in the matter of what warranties of quality may be implied 
in the sales of goods. An implied warranty of suitability for a particular 
purpose has long been acknowledged and applied by the Virginia courts.29 
One who sells goods, knowing of some special use that the buyer intends to 
make of them and that the latter is relying upon his superior judgment that 
the goods are suitable for such use, impliedly warrants that they are fit 
26. 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 24 (1944); 27 AM. JuR. Indemnity § 27 (1940). 
27. Cited and discussed are cases from the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and SL'\-th 
Circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals. The Virginia cases mentioned by 
the court are Commonwealth Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Town of Bluefield, 167 Va. 82, 187 
S.E. 521 (1936), and Hiss v. Friedberg, 201 Va. 572, 112 S.E.2d 871 (1960), the latter 
especially impressive. 
28. See Dillard, Contracts and Sales, 1959-1960 Ann. Survey of Va. Law, 46 VA. L. 
REv. 1626, 1633 (1960), for discussion and comment upon the technique used by the 
court to imply the indemnitor's duty to the indemnitee in the former case brought 
by the injured party against the indemnitee and in which the indemnitor was joined 
as third-party defendant. 
29. See E. I. duPont deNeruours & Co. v. Universal Moulded Prods. Corp., 191 Va. 
525, 62 S.E.2d 233 (1950); Greenland Dev. Corp. v. Allied Heating Prods. Co., 184 
Va. 588, 35 S.E.2d 801 (1945); Universal Motor Co. v. Snow, 149 Va. 690, 140 S.E. 
653 (1927); Standard Paint Co. v. E. K. Vietor & Co., 120 Va. 595, 91 S.E. 752 
(1917); Gerst v. Jones & Co., 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 518 (1879). 
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for tliat purpose. The other warranty of quality that is f~equently implied-
that even thougli no intended special use of the goods is made known to the 
seller, lie nevertheless warrants that the goods which he sells are reasonably 
fit for the purposes for whicli goods of that description are generally used-
has not received the attention of the Virginia courts except in the matter of 
food for human consumption.30 
Under the common law this warranty of merchantability was imputed 
only to a producer or manufacturer of the goods and not to a dealer in 
them. With the support of tlie Uniform Sales Act, 31 the modern view 
extends implication of the warranty to tlie dealer in most jurisdictions, 
even in some states in wliich tlie act has not been adopted.32 
It is extraordinary that the Virginia courts sliould have remained un-
committed as to the existence in Virginia law of tlte implied warranty of 
merchantability. On many occasions the courts liave implied a warranty 
that food could be consumed without liarmful effects, but tlte ratio 
decidendi for tlte result lias been either tlie implied warranty of suitability 
for a particular purpose or a sui generis warranty that food is fit for human 
consumption. 
In Smith v. Hensley 33 the plaintiff, a dealer in a roof-coating product 
designed to reduce the permeation of heat, did not rely upon the skill and 
judgment of the defendant distributor as to the amount of lime to be 
added to the purchased concentrate in preparing the material for application, 
but followed the directions of tlie manufacturer. These directions proved 
to be faulty and resulted in tlie impairment of his customers' roofing. 
Affirming that there was a breach of warranty by the distributor despite 
30. The latest Virginia case concerned with the implied food warranty, Swift & 
Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959), extends it from the manufacturer to 
the consumer who purchased from the retailer, aligning Virginia with many other 
states which have eliminated the privity ordinarily required for breach of contract 
action. For e.'l:tended discussion of this case, see Dillard, Contracts and Sales, 1959-1960 
Ann. Survey of Va. Law, 46 VA. L. REv. 1626 (1960). See also Comment, Implied 
Warranties in the Sale of Food, 17 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 167 (1960). 
31. UNIFORM SALES Acr § 15 (2). 
32. This result is somewhat attributable to the almost coterminous areas of the 
implied warranty in sales by description, that the merchandise sold measures up to the 
agreed description by which the subject goods are identified, and the implied warranty 
of merchantability, that the goods sold are of reasonably merchantable quality for 
goods of that nature. The former is implied at common law, whereas the latter is not, 
at least not for imposition upon the dealer with respect to latent defects. The line 
to be drawn between them, if one can be, is at whatever point the designation of the 
goods can be regarded as a description. Does a product sold as roof coating meet 
that description if you cannot coat roofs with it, '.lt least harmlessly? Is a bed a bed if 
it cannot be slept in? The distinction between a warranty of description and one of 
merchantability in these matters is truly academic. 
33. 202 Va. 700, 119 S.E.2d 332 (1961). 
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the dealer's nonreliance in this respect, Mr. Justice !'Anson holds that a 
roof-coating material, although sold by its brand name, must at least be of 
such quality as not to cause damage to the roofs on which it is used. In 
explicit language he finds that there is an implied warranty that a product 
is fit for the general pm:poses for which it is sold. The opinion seems to 
stress that the roof-coating material was purchased by its brand name and 
that this was essential for the warranty implication. However, the reference 
authority which the Court cites with approval and from which it quotes 
includes sales by description and appears to encompass the whole of the 
area in which the warranty of merchantability would ordinarily be implied 
in Sales Act states. 
It is inconceivable that one who buys a bed from a furniture dealer and 
comes out with something that cannot be slept in, should have no redress 
against the dealer unless either the dealer expressly stated that he could 
sleep in it or he made known to the dealer that he intended to do so.34 
It is reassuring to know that such is not the state of the law in Virginia. 
J. Damages Measured by Cost of Used Car 
In Gertler v. Bowling,35 the Supreme Court of Appeals held that an 
owner's original cost less depreciation is an acceptable measure of damages 
for a car rendered worthless in the breach of a bailee's duty, as well in 
the case of a used car as in that of a new one. 
34. Such as the folding bed of the casebook popular White v. Oakes, 88 Me. 367, 34 
Ad. 175 (1896), which closed like a jacknife whenever laid upon. The Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court, adhering to common law, preferred the senile caveat emptor to 
implying a warranty of the dealer that the bed could be slept in other than doubled up 
inside of it. 
35. 202 Va. 213, 116 S.E.2d 268 (1960). 
